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Purpose:  In our study we intend to investigate if there is a specific 
acquisition component, in line with Grinstein and Hribar’s study, 
in the bonus for CEOs in companies based in Sweden. The 
acquisition component will be studied in an international as well as 
in a domestic context, i.e. acquisitions of foreign and domestic 
companies. 
 
Methodology: Using cross-sectional regression analysis, estimated with OLS, with 
Bonus of Swedish CEOs as dependent variable in order to test our 
hypotheses 
 
Theoretical framework: The theoretical framework contains agency and corporate governance 
theories as well as previously made studies. 
  
Conclusions: We find very weak support for the hypothesis that the CEO bonus 
increases as a consequence of making foreign acquisitions. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction chapter aims to create a better understanding of the purpose of the thesis. 
The chapter starts with describing the background, which leads to a problem discussion and 
ends up with a specification of the problem and the purpose of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In recent years CEO compensation has increased substantially which can be seen as an 
attempt to attract and motivate skilled managers and to get an alignment of managers’ 
incentives and shareholders’ interests. The area of CEO compensation has therefore been 
under great scrutiny of both the public and academics. With increased firm information 
disclosure it is possible to study the composition of compensation packages where the optimal 
composition is the one which completely aligns management’s incentives with the interests of 
shareholders. What may not have been researched as much are bonuses paid to CEOs. This 
kind of pay should be dependent on the performance of the firm, according to the principle of 
optimal contracting, but may in reality also contain pay for amount of effort exerted by the 
CEO. It may also be that executives take advantage of their power over the board to raise their 
pay and that certain events are used to justify an increase in compensation. Such a component 
implies that managers may carry out investments partly as a purpose to raise their pay. An 
acquisition is a type of investment that probably is the most significant resource allocation a 
manager implements and where the potential value destruction is large. Even so, there is 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that CEOs get generous bonuses for completing M&A-deals 
even though most prior research points out that M&A-deals are value-destroying.  
In their study made from a sample of UK firms, Grinstein and Hribar (2003) find that deal 
size and the amount of power the CEO have in the board of directors are the main drivers of 
M&A-bonuses. They suggest that effort and managerial power have significant impact on the 
size of the bonus paid and that CEOs who have more power tend to enter larger deals in 
comparison to the size of their own firms. 
Kroll et al (1990) find that managers in manager-controlled firms get compensated for 
undertaking acquisitions. Managers in owner-controlled firms, on the other hand, do not 
experience higher post-acquisition compensation if the acquisition does not turn out to be 
profitable. 
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Acquisitions tend to enhance CEO compensation which seems to be consequences of various 
agency problems. There is also another dimension of CEO compensation that adds additional 
complexity to the matter, namely that CEOs tend to get compensated for international 
influence on the firm.  
Ramcharran (2002) studies CEO compensation in US companies with foreign operations and 
concludes that the environment surrounding multinational businesses bears risks that 
increases the risk of the whole corporation and hence increases the compensation to the CEO. 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) find that anglo-american influence on Swedish and Norwegian 
corporations leads to higher compensation for the CEO. The influence is captured through the 
product and service market, market for corporate control and the capital market. They argue 
that firm internationalization affects CEO compensation. 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
Clearly, there seems to be international factors influencing compensation components. This 
may, as Oxelheim and Randoy (2005) argue, come as consequences of international 
influences on the firm through which CEO compensation will be affected. The higher risks 
associated with foreign operations are just one factor that raises the executive’s compensation 
level. Another factor might be the importing of pay practices from subsidiaries in countries 
with generally higher compensation levels, as Girma et al. (2002) argue. Yet another 
explanation to why the aspects of internationalization raise CEO compensation is that the 
supply of CEOs with sufficient international experience is limited. As also put forward in the 
discussion above, there exists evidence of an acquisition component in CEO bonuses. Harford 
and Li (2007) argue that an acquisition event presents a natural take-off point for the CEO to 
argue for higher pay. As already mentioned above, Grinstein and Hribar (2003) find that the 
CEO’s power to influence board decisions enables him to use the acquisition event as a 
justification for a higher bonus. The effort exerted by the CEO in the acquisition deal further 
justifies higher pay. Moreover, Chalmers et al. (2006) find that rent extraction determines the 
level of bonus. Whether an acquisition component in the CEO bonus is common for all 
companies in every market remains for now unanswered. Thus, it is interesting to study the 
possibility of an acquisition premium in the CEO bonus in a region where the structure of 
compensation packages and compensation levels are much different from those in markets 
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reviewed in previous studies. Furthermore, considering that international aspects seem to 
influence CEO compensation, will a possible acquisition component in the bonus of the 
acquiring CEO be larger if the acquisition target is located in a foreign country? If so, are 
there differences in the bonus that depends on in which region the target is located? 
 
1.3 Specification of the Problem 
 
The area of interest is the influence of acquisitions on CEO bonuses in an international 
context. This will be investigated by examining the impact of acquisitions of foreign as well 
as Scandinavian targets on CEO bonuses to see whether there is a difference.  
 
1.4 Purpose 
 
In our study we intend to investigate if there is a specific acquisition component, in line with 
Grinstein and Hribar’s study, in the bonus for CEOs in companies based in Sweden and, in 
that case, whether the bonus is higher if the targeted firm is located in a foreign country. 
Our study is motivated by the increased interest from shareholders as well as other 
stakeholders to question the components in CEO compensation packages. We hope to bring 
further insights to this complex matter. 
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1.5 Thesis Outline 
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International Influences on CEO Bonus  Bülow & Prenker 
 - 9 -  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter will describe the most relevant theories concerning the subject of the thesis. The 
different theories aim to create a better understanding for the composition of CEO compensation 
as well as result and the analysis of the thesis. 
 
2.1 Theory of the Firm 
 
2.1.1 Principal-Agent Theory, Agency Costs and CEO Compensation 
 
In most firms, there is a separation of ownership and control of the firm. The owners, 
hereinafter the principals, hire a board of directors who in turn hire the management, 
hereinafter the agent. The separation reflects the investors’ risk aversion and happens because 
of shareholders having limited liability in the corporation and therefore do not risk their total 
personal wealth. The investors must therefore relinquish control of the firm. Furthermore they 
would want to diversify their equity investments which lead to the impossibility of fully 
monitoring the particular corporation’s operations. Thus, separating ownership and control 
becomes natural. (Ogden, J. et al, 2002) 
 
Due to there is a separation of ownership and control there is also a risk of incurring agency 
costs. By assuming that both principals and agents are utility maximisers there is a possibility 
that the agent will sometimes act in accordance to their own interests rather than those of the 
principal. The principal can therefore establish incentive devices to align his interests with the 
agent’s.  (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
In the context of CEO compensation the principal-agent theory deals with issues concerning 
motivating the CEO to act in the shareholders’ best interests. Obviously, the incentive 
alignment approach is one way to eliminate agency costs of this type. CEO compensation in 
the agency setting has been widely scrutinised in the academic literature. A great deal of the 
empirical work has focused on the pay-performance relationship in which the following 
regression is studied. (Garen, 1994) 
     
Yi  is the compensation of firm i and Ri is the income of the firm i. The coefficient b1 measures 
the pay-performance sensitivity. In a similar manner the pay-performance relationship can be 
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tested by including the value of the firm as an independent variable to capture the 
compensation change that originates from stock ownership and stock options. (Garen, 1994)  
2.1.2 Moral Hazard 
 
A moral hazard problem may be present in settings where parties engage in risk sharing under 
the condition that privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome. In 
the context of principal-agent theory this means that management’s actions affect the wealth 
of the shareholders. The problem stems from an information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent resulting from the fact that the principal’s actions cannot be directly observed 
and therefore not contracted upon. Thus, an optimal compensation package which aligns 
management’s interests with those of the shareholders is hard to construct and, hence, optimal 
risk sharing is difficult to obtain. Holmström (1978) defines the principals utility function as 
G(w), where w denotes wealth, and the agents utility function as H(w, a), where a denotes 
action. Moreover, a restriction is made by assuming that H(w, a) = U(w) - V(a). The 
interpretation is that the skill or the effort the action requires reduces the utility of the agent 
and this reduction causes the objectives of the principal and the agent, respectively, to differ. 
To accomplish maximization of the shareholders’ wealth the CEO must be compensated 
according to the effort and skills exerted. In other words, the CEO should receive higher 
compensation if the actions require greater skill or higher effort. Since the actions cannot be 
directly observed and the outcomes can be used as a signal about the action the CEO’s 
compensation should depend on measures of the observable outcome. (Holmström, 1979) 
2.1.3 Prior Literature on Determinants of CEO Compensation 
 
It is widely known that the size of the firm serves as a major determinant in explaining the 
CEO compensation level. There are in general two main explanations to this relationship. 
First, it is assumed that bigger firms generally have larger and more complex organizational 
structures which in turn increase the complexity of managerial tasks and, thus, the job 
becomes more demanding. The second explanation is that firms have established pay 
differentials between levels of managers. Thus, larger organizations generally have more 
levels of managers and hence compensation to the CEO increases as firm size increases. 
(Geiger and Cashen, 2007) 
In light of principal agent theory, many studies have focused on the relationship between pay 
and firm performance. McGuire et al (1962) studies the relationship between profits and 
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compensation and sales and compensation. They find a significant positive correlation 
between sales and compensation but no significant relationship between profits and 
compensation. This suggests that managers have incentives to maximize the scale of 
operations instead of profitability. 
Although this study is somewhat dated the results may still be relevant. A later study by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) finds little relationship between compensation and firm 
performance.   
In studying the link between firm performance and compensation researchers recognize that 
both accounting measures of performance and stock performance have drawbacks with 
respect to determining compensation due to the possible existence of noise in both types of 
measures. (Nourayi and Mintz, 2008) 
 
2.2 Internationalization of CEO Compensation 
 
As firms turn overseas to expand their operations a CEO’s international experience may play 
a crucial role in the future profitability and survival of the firm. 
Managing multinational firms requires skills in addition to those required to manage domestic 
firms. The international experience of a CEO may reduce managerial uncertainty in the 
multinational corporation and contain benefits such as knowledge about various cultures. 
International experience may also be inimitable and non-substitutable. (Daily et al, 2000) 
There have in several studies been suggestions on the possibility of converging pay levels and 
structures around the world which would imply an increasing global labor market for 
executives. This convergence can be explained by a number of factors. Parent companies may 
influence the pay practices in foreign subsidiaries by exporting certain compensation 
compositions. In a similar manner subsidiaries can indirectly affect pay levels in their 
respective parent company. If, for example, a foreign company acquires a US subsidiary the 
parent company may experience pay inequities, because of the high compensation levels in 
the US, which results in raising the pay for executives in the home country. Moreover, 
internationalization of CEO pay may result from benchmarking compensation with that of 
international rivals. (Girma et al, 2002) 
International Influences on CEO Bonus  Bülow & Prenker 
 - 12 -  
 
A higher compensation for CEOs in multinational companies can also be explained by more 
uncontroversial factors. Ramcharran (2002) examines the impact of foreign activity on 
compensation. Cross-sectional regressions with variations of foreign sales, foreign profit and 
foreign assets as independent variables and compensation as dependent variable are run. By 
examining the significance of the variables on the firm-specific level it is concluded that 
compensation is indeed influenced by these foreign operations. A possible explanation to the 
results is that CEOs get compensated for the extra risk the multinational factors bring. 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) examine the impact of Anglo-American influence on CEO 
compensation in Swedish and Norwegian firms. They study the influence through cross-
listings, the product and service market and market for corporate control and show that 
Anglo-American influence indeed can explain cross-sectional variations in CEO 
compensation. It is argued that the risks associated with the firm’s international exposure 
through the product and service market increases CEO pay. Studies have suggested that 
foreign operations enhance a firm’s financial performance which is in turn attributable to the 
increased risk the firm faces. The increased risk in a managerial context implies new complex 
tasks and the fact that the CEO might even be held accountable for market fluctuations which 
obviously is beyond his or her control. Thus, the CEO of a multinational firm will most likely 
demand a pay premium. Internationalisation may also result in so called rent-sharing, which 
means that the CEO demands a stake in the value created by the firm for reasons such as a 
greater risk of dismissal. Moreover, since managerial tasks in an internationalized firm may 
be more complex than those of a purely domestic firm the supply and demand of CEOs with 
international experience may be limited. 
 
2.3 CEO compensation in Scandinavia 
 
The level of CEO compensation in Scandinavia is generally lower than in other European 
countries. The gap is even greater when comparing compensation levels in the U.S with 
Scandinavian levels of compensation. To illustrate the differences a comparison between the 
compensation of Ericsson’s CEO and that of Motorola’s CEO can be made. In 1999 Ericsson 
paid its CEO corresponding US$1.1 million whereas the CEO of Motorola earned US$58.9 
million. Both numbers include the value of stock options. In 1999 an American CEO 
belonging to the S&P500 was paid on average 475 times the average wage of employees. The 
corresponding figures for listed firms in the United Kingdom ranged from 11 times to 24 
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times that of employees. In Sweden a CEO was paid an average 12 times more than the 
average pay of employees. Although it seems that CEOs in Sweden are paid much less than 
their Anglo-American counterparts the corporate governance system in Scandinavia is 
moving towards an Anglo-American system. That is, a more incentive-based compensation 
structure is emerging. This is partly due to the latter years’ increase in foreign equity 
ownership in Scandinavia. (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002) 
 
2.4 Managerial Power Theory 
 
Compensation to executives exists partly to alleviate agency problems. A general view, 
mentioned above, of how to minimize agency costs is to construct the components in 
compensation packages in such a way that it aligns managerial interests with those of the 
shareholders. The managerial power perspective, on the other hand, argues that compensation 
is part of the agency problem. This view states that some compensation components reflect so 
called rent-seeking. The logic behind this rationale is that the board’s tendency to passivity, 
dependence on CEO information and lack of exposure to firm returns enables the CEO to 
extract compensation in excess of the optimal compensation level. 
In their Australian study, Chalmers et al (2006) examines whether rent extraction or labour 
demand determines components of compensation. They run cross-sectional regressions on 
each compensation component, namely fixed salary, bonus, options and shares, with 
economic, governance as well as ownership determinants as independent variables. If there 
are no agency problems, economic determinants alone should explain the variation in 
compensation levels. In their regressions governance and ownership attributes also have 
explanatory power. Except the interpretation that optimal contracting is absent, these results 
can have its explanation in misspecification of the model and/or that the ownership and 
governance attributes explains labour demand aspects not captured by economic determinants. 
For example, significance of board size as independent variable may not imply rent extraction 
by exerting influence over the board. Instead, this result could reflect an aspect of labour 
demand as a consequence of great business complexity a large board implies. To investigate 
the rent extraction and labour demand components further regressions on return on assets and 
stock return are run with the sum of governance and ownership coefficients as well as 
economic attributes as independent variables. The sum of governance and ownership 
coefficients is a proxy for the predicted excess compensation. Predicted excess compensation 
International Influences on CEO Bonus  Bülow & Prenker 
 - 14 -  
 
is found to be significant and negatively related to bonus and options which suggests that 
these components are driven by CEO entrenchment. In conclusion, labour demand determines 
fixed salary and shares compensation whereas rent extraction explains bonus and options 
compensation components. 
 
2.4.1 Managerial Power in an Acquisition Context 
 
It is argued by Harford and Li (2007) that a restructuring of the CEO’s compensation may be 
in place after an acquisition. This is because of that the increase in size and changes in the 
scope of operations may create a natural opportunity for the CEO to negotiate a new 
compensation package. An acquisition may imply a greater business complexity and hence 
the CEO could argue for more pay. When comparing major capital expenditures, another big 
resource allocation event, to major acquisitions it becomes evident that pay changes following 
major capital expenditures is much smaller and more sensitive to performance. An 
explanation regarding this could be that the information environment and the uncertainty 
surrounding an acquisition give the CEO more leeway in arguing for higher pay and thus the 
ability to extract more pay. 
Bebchuk et al (2002) argue that CEOs who have more power will extract higher levels of 
compensation and that these high levels of compensation often are “camouflaged” in such a 
way that it does not cause an outrage from shareholders. An outrage will only occur if there is 
a consensus that the compensation level is not a product of optimal contracting. Hence, under 
the assumption that executives want to maximize rent extraction they might want to find 
justifiable reasons for the higher level of pay. 
Kroll et al (1990) find that CEOs in manager-controlled firms get compensated for completing 
acquisitions whereas CEOs in owner-controlled firms get compensated for acquisition deals 
so long as they are profitable. This is shown to be consistent with earlier findings which 
suggest that manager-controlled firms tend to put more emphasis on the scale of operations 
instead of profitability.  
Probably the most complete and scrutinizing study of M&A bonuses is that of Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004). With a cross-sectional regression they analyze how measures of effort, skill, 
performance and managerial power explain the variation in the bonus. First a regression is run 
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where the dependent variable is bonus and the independent variables are control variables as 
well as an acquisition dummy which equals one if the firm made an acquisition during the 
year and if the deal size was $1 billion or more. 
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ROA is earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets; 
ROAGrowth is the percentage growth in ROA relative to the previous year; Return is the stock 
return of the firm; Margin is earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization divided 
by sales and MarginGrowth is the percentage growth in Margin relative to the previous year. 
The Acquisition dummy is found to be significant and positive which indicates that CEO’s 
who make acquisitions receive higher bonuses even after controlling for other variables that 
may affect the size of the bonus. 
The authors continue by trying to decompose the determinants of the bonus. They define 
measures of effort, skill, performance and managerial power. Deal size is one measure of 
effort and skill and it is assumed that a larger deal may require more effort and skill because 
of its complexity. However, a significant impact of deal size on bonus might be indicative of a 
so called empire building, which may be related to managerial power (p. 137). The other 
components of effort and skill are the time to complete the acquisition and whether the 
acquired firm is a firm from a different industry. An acquisition of a firm from a different 
industry is assumed to require less effort since there are fewer synergies and integration 
problems to consider. The measure for performance is the two-day abnormal return which 
will capture the market’s assessment of the deal. The performance measure is there because to 
the extent that effort is directly unobservable it needs to be measured as an observable 
outcome. This stems from the traditional view that compensation should be based on 
observable outcomes in order to mitigate moral hazard problems. The third and last set of 
variables is those which should capture the magnitude of managerial power. The first and 
second measures are whether or not the CEO is also chairman of the board and whether the 
CEO is a member of the nominating committee, the committee that decides the amount of pay 
and its distribution among management. It is believed that a CEO who is also chairman of the 
board will be able to exert more influence over the board’s decisions. If the CEO is also a 
member of the nominating committee the CEO is more able to influence the selection of 
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directors. The directors that got elected by a highly influential selection from the part of the 
CEO might feel obliged to reciprocate with respect to CEO compensation. The final measures 
are the ratio of insiders on the board of directors and the number of members on the board. If 
there is high proportion of insiders on the board this would indicate a higher degree of 
managerial power. Furthermore, a large number of members on the board would indicate a 
less effective board and thus a higher degree of managerial power. (Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004) 
By comparing summary statistics of the firms in the sample a managerial power index which 
ranges from zero (least managerial power) to three (greatest managerial power). This is made 
by summing up the significant managerial power coefficients for the firms respectively. Then 
the other independent variables are categorized into the index by its median and mean value. 
It is shown that among the least powerful CEOs the mean and median values for Deal Size are 
the greatest. These values decline as the CEO has more power. When Deal Size is set relative 
to total assets it can be seen that the most powerful CEOs tend to engage in larger deals. 
Except for Deal Size, measures of effort and skill do not explain a significant amount of the 
variation in the bonus paid. Moreover, other measures of managerial power plays a significant 
role in explaining the variation in the bonus. In conclusion it seems that the variables of 
managerial power have a much more deeper impact on the bonus than measures of effort, skill 
and performance. (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004) 
 
2.5 Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
2.5.1 The Deal Process 
 
The probability that an acquisition will be successful increases the more sophisticated the deal 
process is. The target screening process typically involves examining and evaluating strategic 
fit, assessing integration risk and assessing closing transaction risk as well as transaction 
effectiveness. Examining strategic fit involve analyzing how the target complements and 
where it is in alignment with the acquirer. While this is a highly important aspect of the 
screening process the main interests for this thesis is in the analysis of integration and 
transaction risks. Key factors when looking at integration aspects may be matching of 
organizational structures, matching of information, management and financial reporting 
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systems and matching of corporate culture. Apart from integration risks, evaluating and 
assessing closing transaction risk and transaction effectiveness is important. This deals with 
issues that may affect the ability of closing on a target and the probability that the seller and 
the buyer will come to terms and successfully integrate operations. Factors to evaluate may be 
corporate governance practices, code of conduct and regulatory compliance issues. 
(O’Connor, 2006) 
 
2.5.2 Legal Determinants of Corporate Governance 
 
Recent research within corporate governance recognizes a strong link between the elements of 
corporate governance and the ability of a country’s legal system to protect outside investors. 
Here, insiders are those who control the firm, be they controlling shareholders or managers, 
and outsiders can be both shareholders and creditors. La Porta et al (2000) states that 
“Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside 
investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders”. Expropriation can happen 
in a variety of different ways, e.g. asset stripping, overpaying executives or put in unqualified 
family members as managers. Investor protection is a necessity because it increases the 
number of potential outside investors willing to invest in the firm and, thus, increased 
protection of outsider investors can enable easier financing for firms. Furthermore, as found 
by La Porta et al (2002), it also enhances corporate value. Indeed, differences in law, 
regulation and enforcement have shown to be correlated with the development of capital 
markets, ownership structure and cost of capital (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 
 
The cross-country differences in investor protection, and consequently corporate governance, 
are to large part products of the different legal systems and its origins whereby the level of 
investor protection is determined. Countries which have adopted French civil law have the 
weakest investor protection whereas Common law countries have the strongest. Countries 
with German civil law and Scandinavian countries fall in between that of countries with 
common law and French civil law when it comes to protection of investors. Some research 
points out that civil law countries generally have weaker protection of private property and 
that governments in such countries tend to be more involved in economic activity. (La Porta 
et al, 2000) 
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In countries with poor investor protection it is common to see a more concentrated control of 
firms and there even the largest firms are usually controlled either by the families who 
founded or acquired the firm or by the state. Furthermore, a family-controlled firm usually 
hires other family members to manage the firm so that it seems that the leeway for managers’ 
expropriation is minimized. Typically, it is the case that firms from countries with strong 
investor protection have dispersed ownership structures. Moreover, dispersed ownership 
structures may reduce shareholders’ incentives and abilities to monitor managerial activities. 
(La Porta et al, 2000) 
 
2.5.3 Legal Determinants and Acquisition Patterns 
 
Rossi and Volphin (2004) show that cross-border M&A activity is positively related to the 
difference in investor protection between the two countries, meaning that it is more common 
to see an acquirer from country with relatively stronger shareholder protection. Thus, the 
probability of a firm making a cross-border acquisition decreases with the investor protection 
of the target’s country. One reason is that it is costly to make acquisitions in countries with 
strong investor protection, due to stronger regulation such as mandatory-bid rules, and, hence, 
firms in stronger investor protection countries tend to look for targets in countries with 
weaker investor protection (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Another reason is that the 
targeted firm recognizes the benefits of improving the corporate governance structure and 
therefore tends to be more willing to sell to a firm in a country with stronger shareholder 
protection. Furthermore, to close the deal the controlling shareholders must be willing to give 
up the private benefits of control. If they get compensated for this loss they are likely to go 
along with the deal which in turn will increase efficiency of the firm. (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004) 
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3. Development of Hypotheses 
In this chapter we will review and discuss theories, in order to develop testable hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Firm Performance and Bonus 
 
As have been stated in the previous chapter the level of compensation to the CEO is affected 
by a big number of factors. The compensation level depends, among other things, on CEO 
tenure, the skills of the CEO and the demand and supply of such skills and characteristics. 
Firm and industry specific factors are also important determinants for the level of 
compensation. Among these factors is size of the firm which has shown to have great 
explanatory power and can be interpreted as an implication of the greater business complexity 
a larger firm has. There is also a well established view that management’s compensation 
should be partly tied to the value created by the firm. By doing so managerial interests are 
aligned with the shareholders’ interests and, in effect, agency costs will be minimized. 
Furthermore, Holmström (1979) states that because the CEO’s tasks not being observable and 
the assumption that the utility function of the CEO is different from that of the investor, the 
CEO prefers performing tasks that do not maximize shareholder value. Consequently, the 
level of compensation should reflect the effort exerted or the skills required managing the 
firm. But, since the board cannot directly observe the tasks compensation should be tied to 
observable measures of outcome. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between CEO bonus 
and performance variables. 
 
3.2 Acquisitions and Bonus 
 
The managerial power approach argues that the CEO has significant power in influencing 
board decisions and that compensation contracts may enable the CEO to extract rents above 
optimal compensation levels. Moreover, as Bebchuk et al (2002) argue, the probability of the 
CEO taking on a compensation arrangement that is unfavorable for shareholders will depend 
on how it is perceived by shareholders. Shareholders are likely to cause an outrage and act 
against the high compensation level if the shareholders view it as a direct expropriation. 
Hence, there is a need for a “camouflage” or a justification of the high pay. An acquisition 
could fit into this framework and be used as a reason for a higher pay. Apart from pure 
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expropriation it can also be argued from a moral hazard point of view that the CEO possesses 
certain skills that are needed to handle acquisition transactions or that the CEO exerts a lot of 
effort managing such a deal. Skills and amount of effort are hard to measure and profitability 
measures may be an imperfect way of assessing these factors. Thus, to the extent that 
profitability measures do not capture the essential skills needed or the effort exerted, the CEO 
should get a higher pay. In addition, the information environment surrounding an acquisition, 
as put forward by Hartford and Li (2007), may create a natural take off point for the CEO to 
argue for higher pay. It may be that these factors enable the CEO to expropriate a higher 
bonus. Thus, we argue that CEOs get a higher bonus when an acquisition has been made.  
Managing international operations may require skills in addition to those needed to manage 
domestic operations. In addition, Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) argue that the supply of CEOs 
with international experience may be limited and that they therefore can extract higher 
compensation levels. It may be that it is more likely that a CEO with international experience 
tends to encourage expansion of operations internationally or it may be that a firm which 
intends to expand operations to foreign countries is more likely to have hired a CEO with 
international experience. In the view of moral hazard theory, international skills may enhance 
the compensation level and, consequently, a CEO with international experience should be 
paid more when making a foreign acquisition relative to a domestic acquisition. That is, we 
argue that the skills facilitate the acquisition procedure and that these skills should be valued 
accordingly. This relationship can hold even though a CEO is lacking international 
experience. Given the additional skills needed to manage international operations, a CEO 
without such skills is more likely to exert more effort surrounding a foreign acquisition 
relative to a domestic acquisition. Work by Ramcharran (2002) and Oxelheim & Randøy 
(2005) suggest that the environment of a multinational firm tends to be riskier and that CEOs 
want to get compensated for the increased risk. Making a foreign acquisition would imply an 
increase in risk and, in the context of managerial power theory, the CEO could therefore more 
easily justify a higher pay. Moreover, there may be additional risks in cross-border 
acquisitions. Such risks may relate to closing of the transaction and various corporate 
governance issues. Considering that Scandinavia has its own tradition of laws the corporate 
governance systems in these countries are similar. International experience may therefore first 
and foremost refer to experiences relating to corporate governance systems in countries with a 
more different legal origin from that of Scandinavia. Thus, we define firms in Scandinavia as 
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having more “domestic attributes” and firms outside of Scandinavia as having more “foreign 
attributes”. The above arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
CEOs get higher bonuses when an acquisition of a firm located outside of Scandinavia has 
been made relative to when an acquisition within Scandinavia has been made. 
 
 
As argued above international skills could enhance compensation levels. In making cross-
border acquisitions there are additional factors that have to be taken into account relative to a 
domestic acquisition. These factors may concern the integration risks due to differences in the 
legal environment, accounting standards and additional differences such as culture. 
Furthermore, we know from Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) and Bebchuk et al (2002) that 
different corporate governance systems and ownership structures may be the source for 
differences in levels of CEO compensation. Girma et al (2002) states that subsidiaries may 
influence pay practices in the parent company. Thus, we argue that the bonus of an acquiring 
CEO may increase when the CEO of the target enjoys a generous compensation level. As the 
level of CEO compensation may be explained by corporate governance systems and 
ownership structures we might be able distinguish certain differences in the acquisition 
component of the bonus depending on the legal environment of the target.  
 
Differences in the levels of compensation depending on different corporate governance 
systems may be very hard to predict. However, there might be more predictable patterns 
concerning the managerial tasks conducted in an acquisition transaction. As stated by 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) there might be stronger market regulations in countries 
with strong investor protection. We argue that this may increase the risk that the transaction 
will not be completed. As firms in countries with poor investor protection generally exhibit 
concentrated ownership structures there is a greater possibility of some shareholders enjoying 
private benefits of control. Rossi and Volpin (2004) states that in the case of an acquisition of 
a firm in a country with poor investor protection the controlling shareholders must be 
compensated for giving up control of the firm. We argue that the possible unwillingness of 
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controlling shareholders to give up their stake in the firm may therefore increase the risk of 
not closing the transaction. However, we recognize that there are a large variety of factors 
which determines the effort exerted or skills needed by the acquiring CEO. Yet, we argue that 
there may be common denominators within each region, defined after its legal origin, that 
determines the skills or effort needed to complete a successful acquisition. According to 
moral hazard theory, effort and skill determines the level of the bonus. We can thus make the 
assumption that there will be differences in the bonus paid to the acquiring CEO that depends 
on the legal environment of the target’s country. Our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
 
Variations in the foreign acquisition component of the CEO bonus can further be explained  
by the legal environment of the target.  
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4. Methodology and Data Description 
The chapter we will build the cross-sectional models that are needed to test our hypothesis.  
 
4.1 Background 
 
To study our hypotheses we will estimate two separate cross-sectional regressions using 
ordinary least squares with CEO bonus, measured in thousands of SEK, as dependent 
variable.  
 
4.2 Data Description 
 
We identify acquisitions made by Swedish firms listed on Stockholm stock exchange between 
2003 and 2006 using the DataStream database containing data on mergers and acquisitions. 
The sample of firms that have made acquisitions is restricted to only contain firms that have 
made full takeovers. Moreover, we collect data on firms that have not made any acquisitions. 
In total we end up with 82 firms that have made acquisitions and 66 firms that have not made 
any acquisitions. CEO cash bonus and the data used to compute accounting measures of firm 
performance are collected from the companies’ respective annual reports. Stock returns are 
collected from the Reuters EcoWin database. 
 
4.3 Assumptions Underlying OLS 
 
Assumption 1 – Linearity 
One of the most elementary assumptions underlying the linear regression model is linearity. 
Linearity means that the dependent variable could be described by a linear function consisting 
of an intercept, an independent variable and an error term (Westerlund, 2006); 
*  ,-,. -- 
To investigate the assumption of linearity of the model we can use the Ramsey’s RESET test, 
which is a test for misspecification of functional form, i.e. a correct functional form is 
assumed to be linear in the parameters (Brooks, 2006).  
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Assumption 2 – Expected value of the error term is zero 
The error term is defined as: 
 -*/01*2 
The second assumption is that on average the error term is zero. The only thing that separates 
*  from   is the constant01*2. Since a constant doesn’t have a variance, the position is the 
only difference between the two distributions (Westerlund, 2006).  According to Brooks 
(2006), if the equation is including a constant term, this assumption will never be violated.  
 
Assumption 3 –The variance of the error terms is constant over time 
The third assumption implies that the relative scale of error terms should be stable as the 
value of the independent variable increase, i.e. all the error terms, , shall have the same 
variance and shall be identically distributed (Westerlund, 2005). This assumption is usually 
called the assumption of heteroscedasticity. If the errors in the regression not are constant, we 
have problem with heteroscedasticity, which could imply that the variance is increasing when 
. is increasing (Brooks, 2006). Using OLS under heteroscedasticity may affect the standard 
errors, which implies that wrong inferences can be made. To test for heteroscedasticity one 
can use White’s general test for heteroscedasticity, which is useful since it makes a small 
number of assumptions about the possible form of heteroscedasticity (Brooks, 2006). 
 
Assumption 4 –Uncorrelated errors 
The assumption of uncorrelated errors, also called the assumption of autocorrelation, implies 
that all error terms are independent of each other, i.e. the value of an error term is 
uncorrelated with the value of any other error term (Westerlund, 2006). Having correlated 
errors can lead to the same problem as in the case with hetroskedasticity (Brooks, 2006). 
According to Brooks (2006) autocorrelation in cross-sectional data is uncommon. 
 
Assumption 5 – The independent variable, 34, are non-stochastic 
The fifth assumption is that the independent variable .,varies and take on at lest 2 different 
values and that ., and the error term is uncorrelated (Westerlund, 2006). If the error term 
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correlates with ., then  will not be the average line anymore, because if x change then will 
also the error term change. If ., are non-stochastic then  will be the average line for any 
given number of . (Ramanathan, 1998).  
If assumption 1 to 5 holds, it can be shown that the OLS-estimator1 has the smallest variance 
of all estimators that is linear and unbiased, that is best linear unbiased estimator also called 
BLUE (Westerlund, 2006).  
 
Assumption 6 – The error term is normally distributed 
The assumption about normality is necessary to be able to construct single and joint 
hypothesis test of the parameters in the model. The most common test for normality is the 
Jarque-Bera test. The JB test use the first 4 moments of a normal distribution, mean, variance, 
skewness and kurtosis, to test for normality (Brooks, 2006). The assumption of normality can 
be disregarded if we have a sufficient large sample of data, since the data then will follow an 
appropriate distribution anyhow. 
 
Assumption 7 – Multicollinearity 
This assumption is about the correlation between the different variables in the regression. If 
the regression includes highly correlated variables, it can occur that the  for the regression 
is very high even when the individual variables not are significant. Another impact that 
multicollinearity may have is that subtracting and adding independent variables will lead to 
large changes of the significance and the value of the other independent variables (Brooks, 
2006). To determine multicollinearity in the data one can analyze the correlation matrix and 
exclude variables with a correlation over 0,82 (Westerlund, 2006). 
  
                                                          
1 Ordinary least squares 
2 A rule of thumb 
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4.4 Definition of Independent Variables 
 
In defining the independent variables we have to rely on theories reviewed in chapter two. 
Firm size has shown to have major explanatory power when it comes to determining CEO 
compensation. From moral hazard theory we know that the bonus paid to CEOs should be 
dependent on observable outcomes. Furthermore, as a starting-point we use the set of 
variables used in the study by Grinstein and Hribar (2004) to determine the pay-performance 
relationship. The performance and control variables are as follows: Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the book value of assets; ROA is operational profit divided by the book 
value of assets; ROAGrowth is the percentage change in ROA relative to the previous year; 
SalesGrowth is the percentage change in sales relative to the previous year; Margin is 
operational profit divided by sales; MarginGrowth is the percentage change in Margin 
relative to the previous year; Return is the stock return of the firm over one year.  
We control for systematic differences in the bonus that are dependent on the industry of the 
acquirer by introducing dummy variables for each industry. We use the classification of 
industries as used by DataStream as take-off point. We end up with four industry categories: 
Manufacturing, Information Technology, HealthCare and Other. 
Because our sample stretches from 2003 to 2006 there is a need to control for increasing 
bonuses over time. This is done by constructing dummy variables for each year. 
As stated in chapter 3 we hypothesize that the CEO will get a higher bonus if an acquisition of 
a firm located outside of Scandinavia has been made compared to if an acquisition within 
Scandinavia has been made. To answer this question we construct two dummy variables –
Scandinavian and Foreign. Scandinavian is assigned a value of one if the firm has made 
acquisitions of targets located within Scandinavia and zero otherwise. Similarly, Foreign 
equals one if the firm has made acquisitions of targets located outside of Scandinavia and zero 
otherwise. Our first regression then is: 
	
        
   
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However, Ramsey’s RESET-test shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of linearity. As 
one of the assumptions underlying OLS is violated we cannot move on without correcting this 
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problem. The only model that shows linearity is one where non-acquisition firms are excluded 
from the sample and where the dummy variables controlling for increasing bonuses over time 
are excluded from the regression equation. Furthermore, after these changes, as can be seen in 
the correlation matrices in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, we note that the correlation coefficient 
between ROAGrowth and MarginGrowth is larger than 0.83. If both these variables are 
included in the regression equation we may have a problem with multicollinearity. We 
therefore exclude MarginGrowth from the equation4. Our final first regression equation looks 
as follows: 
	
        
   

 "#  !  $&56  %8
#
 9;5*-()):  + 
White’s heteroscedasticity test, shown in Appendix B, Table B.4, confirms that we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Thus, the model fulfills all the underlying 
requirements of OLS.  
Our second hypothesis states that variations in the foreign acquisition component of the CEO 
bonus further can be explained by the legal environment of the target. Specifying the impact 
of acquisitions on CEO bonus requires again that we use dummy variables for when and in 
which region acquisitions are made. We define the acquisition dummy variables according to 
the different general corporate governance systems of the targets. As discussed in chapter two, 
the corporate governance system used is often derived from the level of investor protection in 
the firm’s country. Thus, we categorize the acquisitions in terms of the legal environment’s 
origin of the target’s country. Our acquisition dummy variables now are: Scandinavian which 
equals one if the target is located in Scandinavia and zero otherwise; English which equals 
one if the target is located in a country that has English common law origin, and zero 
otherwise; French which is assigned a value of one if the target’s country has a legal system 
that derives from French civil law, and zero otherwise; German which equals one if the 
country of the target has German civil law, and zero otherwise. With all other variables 
remaining the same our second regression equation looks as follows: 
                                                          
3 A rule of thumb, Westerlund, 2006, p.160. See discussion in 4.3 regarding multicollinearity. 
4 See correlation matrix table 4.2 and 4.3 
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White’s heteroscedasticity test, shown in Appendix C, Table C.4, confirms that we have 
homoscedasticity and thus the model fulfills all the underlying requirements of OLS.  
4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The highest mean value of Bonus, which is 3,256 KSEK, is observed for CEOs making 
acquisitions in French civil law countries. The standard deviation of this variable in this 
sample is 2,557.7 KSEK. The next highest mean value of Bonus is 2,981.7 and is observed in 
the sample for CEOs acquiring firms in English common law countries. For this sample the 
standard deviation is 3,128.3 KSEK. As expected, the lowest mean value of this variable is for 
CEOs acquiring firms within Scandinavia. The average bonus is here 1,889.2 KSEK. 
Moreover, the standard deviation is 2,116.3 KSEK. For CEOs making acquisitions of firms in 
countries with German civil law the mean value and standard deviation of bonus paid are 
2,898 KSEK and 2,844 KSEK, respectively.  
The highest mean value of firm size is observed in the French sample, 98.2 billion SEK, while 
the lowest mean value is observed in the German sample, 24 billion SEK. All samples show a 
mean that is higher than the median which indicates that there are a few very big firms within 
each sample.  The highest standard deviation, 237.3 billion SEK, is found among the firms 
making acquisitions in countries with French civil law while the lowest standard deviation, 
25.1 billion SEK, is observed in the German sample. 
Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics for Bonus and independent variables 
 
Kolumn1  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Maximum  Minimum
Bonus 1 887 897 2 359 11 700 20
Size 29 054 593 750 3 370 000 000 101 000 000 000 1 120 000 000 000 58 376 000
ROA  0.046  0.090  0.192  0.395 -0.932
ROAGrowth  3.122  0.094  23.849  249.629 -5.761
SalesGrowth  0.213  0.106  0.566  5.242 -0.520
Margin -0.076  0.084  0.718  0.954 -5.048
Return  0.269  0.212  0.327  1.332 -0.885
 
Kolumn1 HealthCare IT Manufacturing Scandinavian English French German Foreign
 Mean  0.101  0.270  0.405  0.236  0.209  0.149  0.081 0.658  
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Among the performance variables there are higher mean values of ROA among firms that 
have acquired firms in countries with either English common law or French civil law. The 
mean value of ROA within the English sample and French sample is 10.67 % and 10.73 %, 
respectively. This can be compared to the mean value in the Scandinavian and German 
samples of 5.94 % and 8.86 %, respectively. Furthermore, in the sample containing firms 
making acquisitions within Scandinavia a higher standard deviation is observed compared to 
the other samples. The highest mean value of ROAGrowth, being 30.90 %, is observed in the 
English sample while the lowest value, -5.87 %, is observed for firms that have made 
acquisitions in countries with German civil law. This variable has the highest standard 
deviation in the English and the Scandinavian samples of 112.7 % and 111.8 %, respectively, 
while the French and the German samples have a standard deviation in ROAGrowth of 56.2 % 
and 52.5 %, respectively. The highest mean value of SalesGrowth is observed among the 
firms making acquisitions within Scandinavia. Also, the highest standard deviation of this 
variable is observed for the same sample. The mean is 32.1 % and the standard deviation is 
90.1 %, which can be compared to the next highest corresponding values observed in the 
English sample of 15.9 % and 19.5 %, respectively. The means of Margin are fairly similar 
across all samples at values ranging from 10.6 % to 11.3 % with the exception of the mean in 
the Scandinavian sample at a value of 6.7 %. The highest standard deviations of this variable 
are observed in the English sample, 19.3 %, and the Scandinavian sample, 21.7 %. In the 
Scandinavian sample the highest mean Return is observed, being 31 %, while the lowest 
corresponding value of 19.8 % is observed in the English sample. While the standard 
deviation of this variable varies between 26.8 % and 30.4 % across the English, German and 
Scandinavian samples, the standard deviation in Return for firms making acquisition in 
countries with French civil law is 18.5 %.  
22.6 % of the firms making acquisitions in English common law countries were also making 
acquisitions in countries with French civil law. In the same sample 16.1 % and 12.9 % of the 
firms were also making acquisitions in countries with German civil law and Scandinavian 
civil law, respectively. Among the firms making acquisitions in French civil law countries 
31.8 % and 18.2 % were also making acquisitions in countries with English common law and 
German civil law, respectively. As there is no separation of firms making acquisitions in only 
one region from those making acquisitions in several different regions, the descriptive 
statistics is not completely unbiased. The fact that there many firms within the English sample 
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making acquisitions of firms in French civil law countries, and vice versa, may explain the 
similarities of some variables across the two samples. 
 
4.5.1 Correlation Coefficients 
 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 provide the two correlation matrices for each respective model. Will we 
disregard of the high correlation coefficient between MarginGrowth and ROAGrowth as we 
already in chapter 4.4 discussed have discussed this. As can be seen there is a rather high 
correlation, 0.315, between Size and ROA. This may imply that bigger firms tend to be more 
profitable. There is very high correlation between ROA and Margin which tells us that these 
two variables might capture a lot of the same characteristics. But, as the correlation 
coefficient is not above 0.8 we will not exclude one of these variables from our models. 
Interestingly, the correlation coefficient between ROA and SalesGrowth is -0.466 which may 
imply that there is a tendency to maximize sales instead of profitability. Of course, the 
opposite relationship may as well hold. All performance variables have a positive relationship 
with bonus with the exception of SalesGrowth. What is more, foreign acquisitions are, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.297, positively related to bonus. Among the variables of the 
different target regions, French has the highest correlation with bonus. 
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Table 4.2 – Correlation Matrix, Model 1 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Bonus (1) 1.000
Size (2) 0.467 1.000
ROA (3) 0.321 0.315 1.000
ROAGrowth (4) 0.367 0.062 0.300 1.000
SalesGrowth (5) -0.072 -0.291 -0.466 0.086 1.000
Margin (6) 0.264 0.398 0.748 0.145 -0.353 1.000
MarginGrowth (7) 0.241 -0.031 0.279 0.908 0.047 0.120 1.000
Return (8) 0.179 0.018 0.204 0.329 0.024 0.040 0.2921.000
HealthCare (9) 0.128 -0.110 -0.064 0.145 0.061-0.157 0.0290.168 1.000
IT (10) -0.012 -0.381 -0.259 0.146 0.285-0.226 0.225-0.129-0.114 1.000
Manufacturing (11) -0.062 0.166 0.170 -0.210 -0.171-0.012-0.1730.158-0.271-0.463 1.000
Scandinavian (12) -0.137 -0.132 -0.230 0.007 0.136-0.091 0.0940.184 0.098 0.113-0.169 1.000
Foreign (13) 0.297 0.245 0.303 0.098 -0.177 0.131 0.060-0.134-0.041-0.128 0.195 -0.8281.000
 
Table 4.3 – Correlation Matrix, Model 2 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Bonus  (1) 1.000
Size (2) 0.467 1.000
ROA (3) 0.321 0.315 1.000
ROAGrowth  (4) 0.367 0.062 0.300 1.000
SalesGrowth (5) -0.072 -0.291 -0.466 0.086 1.000
Margin (6) 0.264 0.398 0.748 0.145 -0.353 1.000
MarginGrowth (7) 0.241 -0.031 0.279 0.908 0.047 0.120 1.000
Return  (8) 0.179 0.018 0.204 0.329 0.024 0.040 0.292 1.000
HealthCare (9) 0.128 -0.110 -0.064 0.145 0.061-0.157 0.029 0.168 1.000
IT  (10) -0.012 -0.381 -0.259 0.146 0.285-0.226 0.225 -0.129 -0.114 1.000
Manufacturing (11) -0.062 0.166 0.170 -0.210 -0.171-0.012-0.173 0.158 -0.271 -0.463 1.000
Scandinavian  (12) -0.137 -0.132 -0.230 0.007 0.136-0.091 0.094 0.184 0.098 0.113 -0.169 1.000
English  (13) 0.197 0.124 0.201 0.074 -0.090 0.091 0.087 -0.146 0.007 -0.003 0.037 -0.458 1.000
French  (14) 0.219 0.323 0.160 -0.038 -0.091 0.065-0.081 -0.033 -0.043 -0.120 0.249 -0.402 -0.088 1.000
German  (15) 0.091 0.032 0.022 -0.129-0.0668 0.060-0.086 0.020 0.036 -0.090 0.189 -0.138 0.025 0.055 1.000  
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5. Results and Analysis 
In this chapter we will discus and analyze the results from the cross sectional regression from our 
models and compare this results to previous findings in the literature. 
5.1 Model 1 
Table 5.1 – Estimation output, Model 1 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -13655.12 3248.112 -4.204018 **0.0001
Size 599.6134 140.7874 4.259001 0.0001
ROA 3565.574 5017.818 0.710582 0.4798
ROAGrowth 465.0985 315.2694 1.475241 *0.1448
SalesGrowth 336.5606 478.4139 0.703493 0.4842
Margin 334.8731 2215.638 0.151141 0.8803
Return 1009.619 996.3369 1.013330 0.3145
HealthCare 1688.586 1143.575 1.476585 0.1444
IT 1402.862 848.5842 1.653179 0.1029
Manufacturing -157.8259 641.2163 -0.246135 0.8063
Scandinavian 640.4251 880.4081 0.727418 0.4695
Foreign 1600.881 964.6987 1.659462 *0.1016
Number of observations = 80   R-squared = 0.432   Adj. R-squared = 0.340   F-stat = 4.702   Prob(F-stat) = 0.000
*Statistically significant 10 % level (one-tailed)
**Statistically significant 1 % level (one-tailed)  
 
5.1.1 Performance and Control Variables 
 
As we would expect, Size explains a big portion of the bonus paid. The variable is significant 
on the 1 % level of significance. This result is consistent with prior literature suggesting that a 
greater firm size indicates greater managerial complexity and consequently greater 
compensation. This is also consistent with the results of McGuire et al (1962) which state that 
executive compensation is highly related to the scale of the firm’s operations. The variable 
ROA has on average a very big positive impact on the level of bonus, with a coefficient value 
of 3,565.6 KSEK, but it is not significant. This result is inconsistent with that of Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004) who found that return on assets has a positive and significant impact on the 
bonus paid. All other accounting measures of performance have a more modest positive 
impact on CEO bonus. All but one performance variable, ROAGrowth, are insignificant. 
These results are in line with the study of McGuire et al (1962) which finds CEO 
compensation being more correlated with firm size than with profitability. Return has a 
positive but insignificant impact, with a coefficient value of 1,009.6 KSEK, on the bonus paid 
to CEOs. The insignificance of this variable shows that the bonus paid is not strongly related 
to the long-term value creation of the firm which would be expected. This is inconsistent with 
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the principal agency literature which states that compensation should be tied to the value 
created by the firm in order to align managerial incentives to those of the shareholders. 
Furthermore, the non-existent link between bonus and performance may have been caused by 
noise in the performance variables. Yet another explanation to our results might be that the 
compensation packages are not optimally designed with respect to their determinants. 
All our industry dummy variables are insignificant which implies that variations in bonus are 
not explained by the industry the firm belongs to. With a probability value of 0.1029 the 
dummy variable for the IT industry can be considered somewhat of an exception as a 
probability value below 0.10 would imply significance at the 10 % level in a two-tailed 
significance test. The insignificance of the industry dummy variables may have been caused 
by a misspecification of the industry categorization. Hence, it may be that there is a need for a 
more specific categorization. However, due to our relatively small sample of firms, we argue 
that dividing firms into few categories of industries is needed in order to keep as many 
degrees of freedom as possible. Of course there is a trade-off concerning the more correct 
industry categorization and maintaining degrees of freedom.  
 
5.1.2 Acquisition Dummy Variables 
 
The acquisition dummy variables have positive values, as expected. With a t-value of 1.6594 
the dummy for acquisitions outside of Scandinavia is significant at the 10 % level of a one-
tailed significance test. This indicates that we have very weak evidence for CEOs being paid 
exclusively for making acquisitions outside of Scandinavia. Furthermore, this also suggests 
that while CEOs may get compensated for acquisitions outside of Scandinavia, there is no 
evidence of a general acquisition premium as argued in chapter 3. Thus, it might be the case 
that international skills or the amount of effort exerted surrounding cross-border acquisitions 
by CEOs increase the bonus. This would be consistent with our argument regarding moral 
hazard theory which states that observable measures are insufficient determinants of the 
bonus level. Our results may also imply, consistent with the arguments of Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2005), that there is indeed limited supply of CEOs international experience and that 
this, in turn, causes an increase in compensation for these executives. Finally, as argued by 
Girma et al. (2002), the pay practices of the target may influence the level of bonus for the 
CEO in the acquiring company. As we know from Randøy and Nielsen (2002), the 
compensation levels in Scandinavia are generally lower than in the rest of Europe and the 
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United States. An acquisition in either of these regions could therefore increase the bonus of 
the acquiring CEO.  
It is hard to draw any conclusions on the basis of this result regarding the managerial power 
hypothesis. As we have argued in chapter 3 the acquisition event can be used by the CEO as 
an argument for higher pay. It may also be that the information environment surrounding an 
acquisition enables the CEO to more easily negotiate in favor of higher pay. As we have no 
evidence of a general acquisition component in the bonus the premise of an argument in favor 
of the managerial power hypothesis would imply that the CEO is able to extract rents in 
excess of optimal levels when an acquisition is made outside of Scandinavia and not being 
able to argue for higher pay at all when an acquisition within Scandinavia has been made. 
Although we suggest that it may be easier to argue for higher pay surrounding an acquisition 
outside of Scandinavia due to the increasing risk of operations, not being able to make a 
similar argument at all concerning a Scandinavian acquisition may simply seem implausible. 
Furthermore, as we do not control to which extent the firms are engaged in multinational 
activity this further complicates such an argument. This is because it may seem unlikely that 
the risk of the firm increases as the scale of operations in a known region increases. Thus, the 
increase in risk may not be a sufficient argument for higher pay.  
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5.2 Model 2 
 
Table 5.2 – Estimation output, Model 2 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -12636.37 3452.622 -3.659934 **0.0005
Size 593.6704 151.2153 3.925995 **0.0002
ROA 4247.490 5162.571 0.822747 0.4136
ROAGrowth 579.3144 318.9487 1.816325 *0.0739
SalesGrowth 301.4710 487.5492 0.618340 0.5385
Margin -91.46672 2282.254 -0.040077 0.9682
Return 918.7287 1016.772 0.903574 0.3695
HealthCare 1497.385 1183.310 1.265421 0.2102
IT 1247.756 880.4384 1.417198 0.1611
Manufacturing -297.6073 673.5799 -0.441829 0.6601
Scandinavian 12.31437 663.0406 0.018573 0.9852
English 658.1458 618.3915 1.064287 0.2911
French 626.4863 691.9445 0.905400 0.3685
German 828.5142 703.3430 1.177966 0.2430
Number of observations = 80   R-squared = 0.432   Adj. R-squared = 0.320   F-stat = 3.854   Prob(F-stat) = 0.000
*Statistically significant at 5 % level (one-tailed)
**Statistically significant at 1 % level (one-tailed)  
 
5.2.1 Performance and Control Variables 
 
In this regression, Size explains almost the same exact portion of the bonus paid as in 
regression one and is significant on the 1 % level of significance. All performance 
determinants of bonus are insignificant with the exception of ROAGrowth which is positively 
and significantly related to bonus. The t-value of this variable is 1.8163 which makes it 
significant at 5 % in a one-sided test of significance. This is not consistent with the result of 
Grinstein and Hribar (2003) which found no significant relationship between ROAGrowth and 
bonus. Again, our results are more or less in line with those of McGuire et al. (1962).  
Our industry dummy variables show similar coefficient values to those in the first regression. 
Neither of these are significant. Possible explanations to this result are given in the discussion 
regarding the first regression. 
 
5.2.2 Acquisition dummy variables 
 
The acquisition dummy variables divided by region all show positive signs but neither of 
these are significant. The fact that their values are much different to those in our first 
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regression may be explained by the specification of these variables. As one firm may have 
done several acquisitions in different regions the Foreign variable in our first regression 
capture the accumulation of acquisitions. Our second regression, on the other hand, further 
divides the acquisitions into regions which in effect eliminate some of the accumulation 
characteristics of these variables. 
As can be seen the acquisition dummy German has a value that is greater than either dummies 
for acquisitions of firms in countries with French civil law or English common law. This 
result is inconsistent with our suggestion in chapter 3 that higher skills and more effort are 
needed to handle the higher risk of not closing an acquisition transaction of targets in 
countries that have laws of either French or English legal origin. It may be that the closing 
transaction risk is not increased for targets in these regions and, thus, there is no need for 
additional skills or need for more effort to be exerted. Another explanation may be that the 
transaction risk is not a significant risk in an acquisition deal. Other aspects of the deal 
process such as issues of integrating the target may overshadow the risk of not being able to 
close the transaction. Thus, there are probably large variations among the acquisition deals in 
our sample regarding effort and skill needed to complete the respective deals. This may well 
be the case and might therefore explain the insignificance of these dummy variables. The fact 
that the concepts of effort and skill are very hard to define and measure, further complicates 
the testing of our research hypothesis. Our results may also reflect the large variation in the 
control structure of the firms in our sample. Kroll et al (1990) find that managers in manager-
controlled firms get compensated for completing acquisitions regardless of whether the 
acquisition is profitable whereas managers in owner-controlled firms only get compensated 
for completing the acquisition if this turns out to be profitable. Moreover, when we further 
divide the acquisitions according to the target’s regions the variation of control among 
acquiring firms may become more apparent. In addition, the insignificant results may tell us 
that a more narrow classification of targets’ regions is needed. 
 
5.3 Additional Discussion 
 
The validity and reliability of our results is questionable due to a number of reasons. 
Considering that the sample of firms is not chosen at random from all firms listed on the 
Stockholm stock exchange we have a possible selection bias. The exclusion of firms not 
making any acquisitions may further bias our results. Including non-acquiring firms could 
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perhaps change the values and significance levels of our acquisition dummy variables because 
it would in that case be easier to control for general determinants of firm characteristics and 
firm performance. This would also eliminate the potential selection bias. On the other hand, 
the source of the problem with our initial model, described in chapter 4.4, might be that the 
performance and control variables of acquiring firms behave very different from those of non-
acquiring firms.  
Additionally, we do not control for increasing bonuses over time. This would otherwise 
eliminate the potential variations in the bonus that are not dependent on control variables and 
acquisition dummy variables. Another potential problem is that we do not take into 
consideration how much foreign presence each firm already has, something that would 
probably result in more fine-tuned coefficients. For example, this would enable us to draw 
conclusions on whether CEOs with an already established exposure to some foreign market 
get higher bonuses for acquiring firms in that specific geographical area. On the other hand, 
we argue that CEOs of firms with foreign operations may already have a generally higher 
compensation level as a result of their international experience and that this may in fact enable 
them to extract higher rents when making foreign acquisitions. Finally, we do not control for 
CEO tenure, geographical factors or whether several acquisitions within each of the defined 
regions in either model 1 or model 2 has been made by the same firm in the same year. We 
realize that these drawbacks may have caused model specification errors and in turn incorrect 
results. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we will summaries our findings and propose suggestions for additional research. 
 
6.1  Discussions and Conclusions 
 
We examine the impact of acquisitions on the bonus of CEOs in Swedish public companies. 
We hypothesize that acquiring CEOs will get a higher bonus when making foreign 
acquisitions relative to when acquisitions within Scandinavia have been made. Furthermore, 
we argue that the so called acquisition component of the bonus will vary depending on in 
which region the target is located. The regions are defined after legal determinants of 
corporate governance systems.  
By collecting relevant data on Swedish public companies between 2003 and 2006 we end up 
with 80 firms that have made acquisitions. We find very weak support for our suggestion that 
foreign acquisitions have bigger positive impact on the CEO bonus than do acquisitions 
within Scandinavia. As there is no significant positive relationship between CEO bonus and 
acquisitions within Scandinavia we conclude that there is no evidence of general acquisition 
component in the CEO bonus. These results imply that international skills the CEO possesses 
or the effort exerted by the CEO surrounding a foreign acquisition may enhance CEO bonus. 
However, when further dividing the acquisitions according to pre-specified target regions we 
do not find any significant impact of acquisitions on CEO bonus. A possible explanation to 
the our results might be that our results are biased due to the fact that we do not control for 
how many acquisitions have been made in the same year. Thus, it may in reality be that we do 
not have even a weak significant positive relationship between foreign acquisitions and CEO 
bonus. Another explanation to the different results may be that we may have a categorization 
of target’s regions that is too broad. Lastly, we might have various model specification errors.  
We realize that our study have some major drawbacks due to several factors. To begin with, 
we have a possible selection bias as the firms in our sample are not chosen at random from the 
population of firms. Moreover, we do not control for CEO tenure, increasing bonuses over 
time or geographical differences between the acquirer and its targets. 
Despite these drawbacks our study contributes to prior academic research within the field of 
CEO compensation as no previous study has examined international influences on Swedish 
CEOs bonuses in an acquisition context.  
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6.2 Additional Research 
 
The level of CEO compensation and its components have been intensively scrutized by both 
media and academic research. As this has happened for a reason, it is of interest to further 
investigate the components in CEO compensation. 
 
One way to elaborate our study would be to further look into the legal determinants of 
compensation among firms within Scandinavia. Furthermore, it would also be of interest to 
study a possible international acquisition component of the CEO bonus in different markets. 
Since our results shows very weak support of one of our hypotheses and for the reasons 
depicted in the analysis, testing similar hypotheses with a larger sample of firms could be of 
interest. 
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8. Appendix 
Appendix A: Companies 
 
Table A.1 – Companies included in the regression 
Aspiro AB JM AB Sandvik AB
Assa Abloy Klövern AB Sapa AB
Atlas Copco Know IT SCA
Bilia Kungsleden AB Scania
Biovitrum AB Lindab AB Seco Tools
Boliden Lundin Petroleum Ab Securitas AB
BTS Group Meda AB Sigma AB
Eniro AB Modern Times Group MTG AB Skanska AB
Ericsson Munters AB SKF AB
Expanda AB NCC AB Sweco
Fagerhult AB Nefab AB Tele2
G & L Beijer AB Nobia Tele2 AB
Getinge Nobia AB Telefon AB LM Ericsson
Husqvarna AB OEM International AB Telelogic AB
Höganäs OMX AB TeliaSonera AB
Indutrade PartnerTech AB Trelleborg AB
Indutrade AB Peab AB Vattenfall
International Business Systems Precise Biometrics VBG
Intrum Justitia AB Proact IT Group AB Vin & Sprit AB
ITAB Shop Concept Readsoft AB Volvo AB
Zodiak Television AB Rejlers
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Appendix B – Estimation output, Model 1 
 
Table B.1 - Estimation output 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -13655.12 3248.112 -4.204018 0.0001
Size 599.6134 140.7874 4.259001 0.0001
ROA 3565.574 5017.818 0.710582 0.4798
ROAGrowth 465.0985 315.2694 1.475241 0.1448
SalesGrowth 336.5606 478.4139 0.703493 0.4842
Margin 334.8731 2215.638 0.151141 0.8803
Return 1009.619 996.3369 1.013330 0.3145
HealthCare 1688.586 1143.575 1.476585 0.1444
IT 1402.862 848.5842 1.653179 0.1029
Manufacturing -157.8259 641.2163 -0.246135 0.8063
Scandinavian 640.4251 880.4081 0.727418 0.4695
Foreign 1600.881 964.6987 1.659462 0.1016
Number of observations = 80   R-squared = 0.432   Adj. R-squared = 0.340   F-stat = 4.702   Prob(F-stat) = 0.000
 
Table B.2 – Ramsey’s RESET test 
 
Ramsey's RESET Test Kolumn1 Kolumn2 Kolumn3
F-statistic 2.100823 Prob. 0.151885
Log likelihood ratio 2.469922 Prob. 0.116044  
 
Table B.3 – Normality test 
 
 
0
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14
-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 80
Observations 80
Mean      -6.08e-13
Median  -234.9231
Maximum  7434.021
Minimum -4498.058
Std. Dev.   1948.301
Skewness   1.221442
Kurtosis   5.719860
Jarque-Bera  44.55108
Probability  0.000000
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Table B.4 – White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
White's heteroscedasticity test Kolumn1 Kolumn2 Kolumn3
F-statistic 0.902041 Prob. 0.574481
Obs*R-squared 15.86320 Prob. 0.533553  
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Appendix C – Estimation output, Model 2 
 
Table C.1 - Estimation output 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -12636.37 3452.622 -3.659934 0.0005
Size 593.6704 151.2153 3.925995 0.0002
ROA 4247.490 5162.571 0.822747 0.4136
ROAGrowth 579.3144 318.9487 1.816325 0.0739
SalesGrowth 301.4710 487.5492 0.618340 0.5385
Margin -91.46672 2282.254 -0.040077 0.9682
Return 918.7287 1016.772 0.903574 0.3695
HealthCare 1497.385 1183.310 1.265421 0.2102
IT 1247.756 880.4384 1.417198 0.1611
Manufacturing -297.6073 673.5799 -0.441829 0.6601
Scandinavian 12.31437 663.0406 0.018573 0.9852
English 658.1458 618.3915 1.064287 0.2911
French 626.4863 691.9445 0.905400 0.3685
German 828.5142 703.3430 1.177966 0.2430
Number of observations = 80   R-squared = 0.432   Adj. R-squared = 0.320   F-stat = 3.854   Prob(F-stat) = 0.000
 
Table C.2 – Ramsey’s RESET test 
 
Ramsey's RESET Test Kolumn1 Kolumn2 Kolumn3
F-statistic 3.180195 Prob. 0.079204
Log likelihood ratio 3.821349 Prob. 0.050603  
Table C.3 – Normality test 
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Mean      -1.24e-12
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Probability  0.000000
International Influences on CEO Bonus  Bülow & Prenker 
 - 46 -  
 
Table C.4 – White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
White's Heteroskedasticity Test Kolumn1 Kolumn2 Kolumn3
F-statistic 0.597813 Prob. 0.893304
Obs*R-squared 12.73397 Prob 0.851907  
 
